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International capital markets are inherently unstable, and may precipitate an 
unnecessary currency crisis as a result of a failure by differentiated investors to co-
ordinate their actions in response to a “mild” fundamental shock. This paper illustrates the 
point in a simple 3-period model, in which two heterogeneous risk-averse representative 
investors enter the market at different stages, and a policy-maker who, having to adjust to 
a current account shock, faces the decision whether or not to devalue the currency. A 
range of values for the shock is identified over which two equilibria, both rational, coexist. 
In the “good” equilibrium absence of capital flight and ongoing lending allow an orderly 
adjustment (no regime switch); in the “bad” one capital flight and the drying up of fresh 
inflows force the policy-maker to devalue. The short-term nature of capital flows is seen 
as a crucial determinant of such instability, and the availability of an international lender 
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The literature on currency and financial crises has received much stimulus by a series 
of recent episodes, including the devaluation of some ERM currencies in 1992-93 and the 
more recent crises in Mexico (1994-95) and East Asia (1997-98). In the last 20 years, i.e. 
since Krugman’s 1979 seminal paper, three broad categories of models have been 
developed of currency crises. 
In first generation (fundamentals based) models the hint of Krugman is followed in 
viewing currency attacks as the result of some inconsistencies in domestic economic 
policies. A number of extensions has refined Krugman’s original contribution
1, but they 
all share its main message: currency attacks are the necessary outcome of some macro-
inconsistencies; the focus, in particular, is in the combination of a fixed exchange rate with 
domestic credit creation in excess of demand, the blame of which usually falls on the need 
to finance Government budget deficits. While such models have received some support 
from the empirical literature, they do not appear to fit too well the most recent episodes, 
where fundamentals (there including the budgetary position) had not raised any major 
concerns among most observers, and the attacks appeared, ex ante, unjustified
2. 
Second generation models, pioneered by Obstfeld (1986a)
3, show how a crisis may 
erupt even in the absence of weak fundamentals, simply because it is expected to occur. 
This may happen because defending the peg is costly to the economy (in terms, for 
example, of high interest rates and subsequently larger unemployment). Introducing 
Government preferences explicitly into the analysis generates the possibility of self-
fulfilling crises. Agents’ devaluation expectations may drive the mentioned costs so high 
to force the Government to devalue; on the other hand, if agents do not expect a 
devaluation and those costs are absent, then the fixed exchange rate regime proves 
sustainable. Self-fulfilling models have been blamed for not providing an economically 
meaningful solution to the issue of what determines the expectational shift which, given 
indeterminacy, is necessary to trigger a regime switch
4. 
                                                           
1 See Agenor and Flood (1994) for a survey, Flood and Garber (1984), Obstfeld (1984 and 1986b) and Willman 
(1988a and 1988b). 
2 Examples of empirical studies on the subject are Blanco and Garber (1986), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 
(1996) and Goldberg (1994). 
3 See also: Obstfeld (1994 and 1996), Ozkan and Sutherland (1994), Davies and Vines (1995), Jeanne and Masson 
(1998); for challenges to the multiple equilibria hypothesis see Krugman (1996) and Morris and Shin (1998); 
empirical evidence can be found, for example, in Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) and Jeanne (1997). 
4 See, however, Krugman (1991), Davies and Vines (1994) and Sachs (1995). A third, more recent, view raises the issue of moral hazard, which may dominate 
domestic investment decisions if Government cannot credibly commit not to bail out a 
disrupted financial sector in the event of a major crisis. Financial intermediaries may thus 
be led to invest in overly risky assets, with resulting weakening of the system as a whole. 
The blame is again on the Government, who accumulates contingent liabilities, bound to 
show up in the taxpayers’ bill (including the possibility of reliance on the inflationary tax), 
in the event of a major negative shock
5. The moral hazard hypothesis is not new in the 
literature
6, but it does not give a fully satisfactorily account of what happened, for 
example, in Asia: as noted by Radelet and Sachs (1998), all types of foreign investment 
appear to have neglected any supposed deterioration in the overall risk and efficiency 
profile, including (for example) equity and real estate investments, which are unlikely to 
rely on any form of ex post bail out
7. 
The above accounts do little justice to the problem of international capital market 
instability, which often appears to be the natural outcome of an increasingly globalised 
and unrestricted international financial system, rather than of poor macro- or 
microeconomic management. This is true a fortiori if one acknowledges the advances 
recorded in the literature on asymmetric information and credit rationing
8. If capital 
markets do not clear, and the terms of international borrowing are governed by the supply 
side, then the causes of instability might have to be looked for in the interactions and 
externalities proper of investors’ behaviour, especially with respect to their attitude 
towards the returns and risks involved in international lending. The part of the literature 
which responds most closely to these concerns is that coming out of the Diamond and 
Dyvbig (1983) contribution to the banks run tradition
9. Diamond and Dyvbig show how 
failure of different lenders to co-ordinate may turn a borrower’s (temporary) liquidity 
shortage into insolvency, by forcing her to early and inefficient liquidation of long term 
profitable assets. Although in Diamond and Dyvbig the focus is on destruction of physical 
value, the idea is easily extended to the financial sector, where the grab is rather on foreign 
                                                           
5 See Velasco (1987) for a model of  the experience of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay at the beginning of the 80s; 
McKinnon and Pill (1996), who coined the term “overborrowing syndrome”; Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo 
(1998) and Krugman (1998) for models inspired by the recent Asian experience. 
6 See Diaz-Alejandro (1985), who discusses the issue with respect to the Chilean crisis; see also Edwards (1984 and 
1996), who also deals with the cases of Argentina and Uruguay. 
7 Krugman (1999) also acknowledges Radelet and Sachs’ concerns. 
8 Pioneers in the field are Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
9 See, among others, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) with respect to Mexico, Radelet and Sachs (1998) with 
respect to East Asia. For a formal model, see Chang and Velasco (1998). currency, and investors fear shortage of foreign exchange and currency losses
10. This view 
seem to fit some empirical regularities, notably: the large increase in short term foreign 
liabilities and the growing imbalance between market liquidity and foreign exchange 
reserves which are observed in the lead up to crises; the fact that capital flight appears to 
follow the drying up of new lending; the significance of debt maturity and financial 
liberalisation as predictors of balance of payments crises
11. 
Another series of contributions linking financial crises to some form of capital market 
imperfections derives from the work on the credit channel and the financial accelerator
12. 
In these models, credit amplifies the consequences of a shock by behaving procyclically, 
as a consequence of the cyclical evolution of the value of collateral assets. For example, 
Edison, Luangaram and Miller (2000) build a model, based on Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997), in which financial collapse results from a credit crunch, which forces a massive 
sale of assets by credit constrained financial companies and is reinforced by the 
subsequent deflation
13. Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (1999) investigate the role of 
imperfect credit markets and capital mobility in generating instability in small open 
economies. 
 
The internationalisation of capital markets has long been recognised an opportunity for 
improvement of the risk-return profile of investors’ portfolios; the results in this area of 
modern finance build on the assumption that investors are risk averse, and assets in 
different Countries are imperfect substitutes for each other. In such a world, capital flows 
are the result of a stock adjustment
14. Yet, the literature on currency crises has tended to 
deny relevance to the issue of portfolio optimisation and risk aversion, so that the supply 
side of the market is rarely modelled explicitly, being replaced by the doubtful uncovered 
interest parity relationship. Another point which also would deserve more attention is the 
time dimension of stock adjustment; adjustment is not instantaneous, and this could result 
from adjustment costs or some form of heterogeneity among investors. 
                                                           
10 This is not to say, however, that the original spirit in Diamond and Divbig does not capture some important facts 
in recent crises, like the overly sharp real contraction to which the crisis economies have been forced. 
11 See Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1996) and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996). 
12 See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998). and Aghion, 
Bacchetta and Banerjee (1999). 
13 The model is especially suited to characterising the crisis in Thailand, where a bubble in land prices and 
overexposure of domestic financial intermediaries were an important source of instability and a precondition for 
financial collapse. 
14 See Dornbusch (1983), Edwards (1984) and Brainard and Tobin (1992). The transfer problem is another important issue often overlooked, and this also derives, 
partly, from the above deficiencies. The transfer problem arises when the domestic 
balance (between demand and supply) and the external trade balance need to adjust to 
match a reduction in capital flows
15. The issue becomes crucial, in particular, when capital 
flows are viewed as a temporary phenomenon (the portfolio approach), and the recipient 
Country runs a current account deficit: when portfolio adjustment comes to an end, then 
policies aimed at restoring current balance need to be implemented. This perspective may 
have significant consequences on the behaviour of investors, who may fear adjustment 
eventually to be achieved by means of exchange rate depreciation. 
The simple model I develop in the next section is in an attempt at filling the above 
mentioned gaps and a contribution to the interpretation of recent crisis episodes in Mexico 
and East Asia, from which the present work has taken inspiration. Anticipating the main 
results, I show how a Country with a large stock of short term liabilities may be vulnerable 
to capital markets instability, in the sense that the eventual inability of different categories 
of investors to co-ordinate their actions in response to a “mild” fundamental shock triggers 
a crisis which the shock, by itself, would otherwise have not caused (this is the sense in 
which the shock is mild). 
 
 
2   The  model 
 
There are three periods (denoted by 0, 1 and 2) and three agents: a policymaker (the 
domestic Government) and two representative investors (denoted by I0 and I1).  
The Government is assumed to minimise a loss function (L) which depends on 
deviations of output and real exchange rate given desired levels. The target for output (Y) 
is the natural level; the target for the real exchange rate (s) is the level which balances the 
expected current account, as calculated later (see equation 5). The Government fixes the 
exchange rate at the desired level, at the beginning of period 0, and she is assumed to bear 
a fixed cost in the event of a regime switch (i.e. either a devaluation or an appreciation). 
The loss function is specified as follows: 
 
() ()
2 2 2 dC s s z Y Y L t t + − + − =    (1) 
                                                           
15 An exaustive discussion of the transfer problem is offered by Reisen and van Troetsenburg (1988).  
where t = 0,1,2; Yt is period t output; st is the real exchange rate at t; C
2 is the regime 
switch fixed cost (d is a dummy variable which takes on the value 0 if the exchange rate is 
not changed, and 1 in case of either devaluation or revaluation); z is a positive weight 
parameter, indicating the bias in Government’s preferences towards real exchange rate 
relative to output deviations from target. 
The choice of the variables included in the loss function is rationalised as follows. 
Output deviations generate (political) costs in terms of excessive unemployment if output 
is below its natural level, or inflationary pressure if it is above (Barro and Gordon, 1983). 
Real exchange rate deviations from equilibrium create distortions in incentives to 
production of tradeables relative to non tradeables; furthermore, if prices are rigid, 
Government may be concerned with the impact of a nominal devaluation on the level of 
real wages, and the distribution of wealth in the economy (for this argument, see 
Dornbusch, 1980). The fixed cost captures the costs associated to the loss of credibility, 
which follows the failure of a fixed exchange rate policy; such costs include the 
inflationary bias suffered by an economy when economic policy is dynamically 
inconsistent (Barro and Gordon, 1983)
16.  
 
The two representative investors can hold domestic (peso) and foreign (dollar) interest 
bearing assets.  Peso nominal and real returns are denoted, respectively, by r and i; the 
corresponding for dollar assets are denoted by r
* and i
*. Investors are endowed with a 
given wealth w (of which a fraction π is held by I0, and the rest by I1), initially invested in 
dollar assets.  
Their choices with respect to asset holdings result from optimisation of a risk averse 
utility function as will be explained later. Demands for peso assets by I0 and I1 in period t 
are denoted, respectively, by 
t K0 and
t K1 , and will depend on relative (peso vs dollar) 
returns and on their variability.  
It is assumed that I0 only enters the market in period 0, while I1 enters in period 1. The 
introduction of two different types of investors, and the timing of their actions, reflect the 
view of capital inflows as a stock adjustment phenomenon
17. I0 and I1’s unsynchronised 
                                                           
16 Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) show how a Government can take advantage from credibly restricting the set of 
available policy options,  when this affects agents’ expectations and their behaviour. 
17 See Brainard and Tobin (1992) and Edwards (1984). Edwards illustrates how interpreting capital flows as an 
asset adjustment phenomenon may lead to their short run overshooting  and shows the consequences for 
sustainability of an overly appreciated real exchange rate. actions capture the graduality in adjustment to equilibrium. Different explanations for such 
graduality might be given, including the existence of adjustment costs and heterogeneity 
in information sets among different investors. Here it is assumed that I0 and I1 have 
different access to available information about the domestic economy; in particular, I0 is 
assumed to be better informed (hence she can exploit improved prospects for the domestic 
economy earlier), while I1 has a lagged access to such information (or maybe she just 
infers it from the behaviour of I0). I0 are called “pioneers” and I1 “late investors”, and 
0
1 K  
is restricted to be 0. At the beginning of period 1, I0 eventually readjusts her portfolio (this 
happens if 
1
0 K   ≠ 
0
0 K ), according to newly available information; this includes, in 
particular, as will be formalised later, the realisation of a shock to the current account in 
period 0. 
The sequencing of actions may then be summarised as follows. After the exchange rate 
has been fixed, I0 enters the domestic market and acquires 
0
0 K  peso assets; subsequently, a 
shock hits the current account; at the beginning of period 1, after observing period 0 
shock, I1 invests 
1
1 K  in peso assets and I0 adjusts her portfolio by (
1
0 K  - 
0
0 K ). Afterwards, 
period 1 shock to the current account is realised.  
Remember that, by assumption, both had no peso assets to start with.  
 
The current account is assumed to be a linear function of the real exchange rate (s), the 
level of real income Y and a random autonomous component X. The equation for the 
current account in period t is: 
 
t t t t Y s X CA γ β − + =      (2) 
 
where β and γ are positive parameters (the standard conditions for the positive effect of 
a real devaluation on the trade balance are taken to apply). 
The autonomous component at time t is assumed to be the sum of its previous period 
value and an independently and identically distributed zero mean random shock (εt), 
whose distribution function is known to agents. The expected value for the period zero 
autonomous component is X, so that we have: 
 
= 0 X  X  +  ε0  t t t X X ε + = −1     t = 1,2   ε2 = 0    (3) 
 
where  ) , 0 ( ~
2
ε σ ε iid t . 
At time 0 the authorities set s at the level s such that the expected period 0 current 
account is in balance, i.e. such that: 
 
() 0 0 0 = − + = Y s X CA E γ β      (4) 
 
s thus is given by:    X Y s s
β β
γ 1
0 − = =    (5) 
 
 
Period 2, rather than being the last period in life for the representative agents, when 
everything is consumed and debts have to be repaid, is represents the idea of a steady state 
in an infinite horizon framework, where agents keep their financial wealth optimally 
invested and eventually consume the return it yields. This is meant to capture the idea of a 
series of investors, flowing in and out of the domestic Country
18, which can in principle 
rely indefinitely on a steady (non exploding) level of foreign savings to finance her own 
investment and consumption needs. Hence we can think of periods 2 up to infinity as 
collapsing into one single time point (period 2). From the interpretation of t = 2 as a steady 
state follows having set ε2 = 0. 
What is required in period 2 is that the current account be in balance, which is the 
equivalent of the intertemporal constraint that an open economy faces in standard 
optimising models, as no repayment of principal is to be done. If any shocks affect the 
current account in early periods and generate an unbalanced position (say a deficit), then 
in period 2 the Government will have to engineer a riequilibration. This can be done by 
either depreciating the real exchange rate or by deflating domestic output, or by a 
combination of devaluation and deflation. It is assumed that the authorities can manipulate 
real output (by means of standard fiscal policy instruments
19) and the real exchange rate in 
                                                           
18 Sen (1994) develops an overlapping generations, infinite horizon model with new births, where the ricardian 
equivalence is shown to break down if no altruistic behaviour is assumed. The idea of new births is very much 
analogous, analytically, to that of heterogeneous investors expressed in this discussion. 
19 It can be assumed that real output is demand determined, so that the Government can control it by controlling 
public sector consumption and investment demand. the desired way
20. The choice of the adjustment policy is eventually determined by 
Government preferences as expressed in the loss function L. Having to achieve the current 
account balance, output and real exchange rate at t = 2 have to satisfy the following 
constraint: 
 









− =       ( 7 )  
 
 
2.1  The behaviour of the Government 
 
Government’s behaviour in period 2 is best analysed by first assuming the fixed cost 
away, which means that she has no concern for credibility. Hence dC
2 is momentarily 
dropped from the loss function. The Government then has to minimise the following loss 
function 
'
2 L  subject to (7): 
 






2 s s z Y Y L Min − + − =  
 





− =   
                                                           
20 This is a much more unrealistic assumption. It is meant  to resemble the analogous assumption made elsewhere in 
the literature (for exampe in Davies and Vines, 1995), with the understanding of it being an expositional device, 
rather than a representation of reality. In the real world, the exchange rate is the relative price of two assets, and as 
such is to be determined by the corresponding demands and supplies. One possible justification of this assumption 
is the imperfect indexation of wages and prices to the exchange rate, so that a nominal devaluation entails some real 
devaluation. However, it will also be assumed that the Government fully sterilizes intervention in the foreign 
exchange market, so that in the period when the exchange rate is kept fixed the supply of peso assets will perfectly 
match the swings in demand. This also allows to abstract from the determination of the peso interest rate (the dollar 
rate is anyway assumed constant) and its variability, and to concentrate on the issue of exchange rate risk, which is 
the focus of the discussion. Of course, assuming that the Government can engineer a real devaluation implies, in a 
portfolio balance context, that she issues or retires bonds from the market, which inevitably alters the conditions in 
the money market and the equilibrium interest rate. But the argument about the possibility of an unnecessary 
financial panic will be developed under the drastic assumption that, if a devaluation is expected to occur currently, 
investors leave the market to avoid an instantaneous capital loss.  
In what follows, 
*
2 Y  and 
*
2 s  denote the optimal solutions for the output and real 
exchange rate levels. (7) can be substituted into 
'
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=      ( 1 0 )  
 
Substituting (5) into (10) gives: 
 









        ( 1 1 )  
 
It easy to check that the second order condition is satisfied at Y = Y2
*. Given the 
assumed parameter signs, the loss function is convex in Y2, and the second order 
derivative with respect to Y2 is always positive, which is the condition for a minimum: 
 

















∀ Y2 > 0  
                                                           
21 Both output and real exchange rate are instruments suitable for minimization, as they have been assumed to be 
both under the authorities’ control. Here minimization is worked out with respect to Y2, and the adjustment 
constraint (7) is substituted for s2 into the objective function.  
Y2
* is the level of Y2 which the authorities would choose if they have to adjust in period 
2, as a function of (X2 - X). Note that (X2 - X) is nothing but the value of the cumulative 
shocks in the three periods, i.e.: (X2 - X) = (ε0 + ε1), and is the level of the current account 
in period 2. 
The optimal Y2
* is increasing in the level of the cumulative shocks. This is simply 
because the larger the (positive) shocks to the current account or, equivalently, the 
autonomous component X2, the larger the level of Y2 compatible with current account 
equilibrium (more imports, which depend positively on income, are allowed). Clearly, if 
no shocks occur (or they exactly sum up to zero), in which case X2 = X, then Y2
*=Y, i.e. 
no adjustment to Y is necessary, being the initial output level compatible with current 
balance at the initial level X. 
Y2
* is also increasing in the value of the parameter z. This has the obvious 
interpretation that the larger the importance the authorities attach to exchange rate 
deviations from target, relative to output deviations from the natural level (i.e. the larger 
z), the more of the required current account adjustment will be born by output. 
It should be remembered that Y2
* is found by assuming away any fixed credibility costs 
associated with an exchange rate devaluation; hence, however small the (absolute) size of 
the (say negative) cumulative shocks, adjustment will be achieved by a combination of 
output deflation and real exchange rate depreciation. The optimal level of the real 
exchange rate is found by substituting (16) for Y2
* into the adjustment constraint (9), 
which has been imposed on top of the optimisation program, and thus relates Y2  and s2 




































































+ = − =
   (12) 
 The optimal devaluation (revaluation, if negative) is found by subtracting the 




































   (13) 
 
As for optimal output, it is straightforward to see that if no shocks cumulate on the 
current account, i.e. (X2 - X) = 0, then no devaluation is required, because the initial 
(fixed) exchange rate is perfectly compatible with balanced current account (indeed it has 
initially been set so as to achieve balance). 
It should be noted that the authorities could use some of the foreign reserves 
accumulated up to period 2 in order to finance part of the current account deficit and 
reduce the required adjustment. In principle, however, adjustment can only be 
postponed
22, because reserves are limited and the deficit is not reverting to equilibrium 
(this is a consequence of the assumption about the process generating the autonomous 
component Xt). The assumption that the entire adjustment is carried out at the beginning 
of period 2 can be rationalised as a consequence of investors’ concern about aggregate 
liquidity measures such as the quick ratio (i.e. the ratio of short term external liabilities to 
foreign reserves); the authorities may then aim at keeping the level of reserves from falling 
to levels that could render the system vulnerable to a panic-led crisis. 
 
So far, the optimal Government’s choice about the size of deflation and devaluation has 
been derived absent any concern for the credibility costs of a regime switch. The optimal 
response to cumulative shocks, however small they are, has been found to be a 
combination of deflation and devaluation. 
Intuitively, however, once the fixed  credibility cost of devaluation (C
2) is reintroduced 
in the loss function, there will be a range of values (centred around zero) for the 
cumulative shocks (ε0 + ε1), for which achieving the above trade off between deflation and 
devaluation yields lower welfare than keeping the exchange rate unaltered and letting the 
adjustment being born entirely by output. The latter option implies an additional loss, which the Government suffers relative to achieving the optimal trade off between deflation 
and devaluation; such additional loss is zero in the limit, as the size of the cumulative 
shock tends to zero. The inclusion of a strictly positive fixed cost will then reverse 
Government’s judgement, for a sufficiently small required adjustment, i.e. for small 
absolute values of the cumulative shocks. 
When regime switch is costly, the choice of devaluing becomes discrete: for a 
sufficiently small required adjustment, no devaluation will be allowed, being the 
additional costs of a regime switch (i.e. the fixed cost) larger than the corresponding 
benefits (given by the possibility to trade off deflation and devaluation optimally). In order 
to identify the critical size of the cumulative shocks which triggers the decision to devalue, 
the policy loss with and without devaluation need to be compared. 
 
If the Government decides not to devalue, so that adjustment is born entirely by output, 
then the equilibrating level of Y2 can be found by substituting s (the unchanged real 
exchange rate) for s2 in the adjustment constraint (9), which has to be satisfied in 
equilibrium. The resulting output level is given by: 
 
() X X Y Y
n − + = 2 2
1
γ
      ( 1 4 )  
 
The associated welfare loss (L
n) is calculated by substituting (14) for Y2 in the loss 
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− − + =
γ γ
   (15) 
 
(15) has to be compared to the loss which obtains when output and the real exchange 
rate are set optimally according to rules (11) and (12) and the fixed cost is added. In this 
case welfare loss (denoted by L2
d) is equivalent to: 
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The regime switch (i.e. the choice to devalue) will occur if the cumulative shocks (X2 - 
X) is sufficiently large that the welfare loss associated to devaluing (L2
d) is smaller than 
the loss associated with the adjustment being born entirely by output deflation (L
n). 
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Inequality (17), may be rearranged as follows: 
 













+ ≥ − ⇔ + ≥ −    (18) 
 
(18) is a condition on the size of the cumulative shock. As intuitively discussed 
previously, (18) defines an interval around zero for the cumulative shocks, outside which 
devaluation is optimal; correspondingly, sticking to the fixed exchange rate regime is 
welfare superior for the Government if the cumulative shocks shock are sufficiently small 
(in absolute value) to be within the critical range. 
 
The situation depicted so far can be represented graphically as in figure 1. Here 
attention is focussed on the case of negative current account shocks.  FIGURE 1 
 
The circular lines are the iso-loss loci; a larger welfare loss corresponds to loci which 
are further from point O. Point O is the initial state, where the economy enjoys full 
employment and the real exchange rate is fixed at the level which equilibrates the current 
account. 
The positively sloped lines represent the adjustment constraints. From the previous 
analysis it emerged that, in order to adjust to given cumulative shocks, a trade off exists 
between exchange rate and output management, so that the same adjustment can be 
achieved by different combinations of output deflation and exchange rate devaluation. The 
adjustment lines are located further to the left (meaning a larger adjustment need), the 
lower is the realisation of the cumulative shocks. 
The negatively sloped line is the optimal trade off for the Government, going through 
point O; it says how the Government wishes to move away from the zero loss point O if 
forced to do so.  The first segment of this locus is broken because for sufficiently low 
(absolute) value of the shock it is optimal not to alter the real exchange rate, and to 
manipulate only the level of output. This resulted from the comparison of the welfare 
losses associated to adjustment with and without devaluation. Hence, that segment is 
replaced by the portion of the horizontal line through O, between Y and Y
c, where Y
c is 
the cut-off output level at which devaluing becomes optimal. Y
c can be found by first 
calculating the corresponding cut-off value for X










optimal policy combination 
X2  < Xc 
X2  = Xc 
X2  = X 
f satisfied with strict equality. Focussing on the case of negative shocks, the cut-off value is 
given by: 
 
z C X X
c 2 2 γ β
β
γ
+ − =      ( 1 9 )  
 
This value can be substituted for X2 into the expression for the optimal output level 






c 2 2 γ β
β
+ − =      ( 2 0 )  
 
 
The previous analysis has shown the intuitive result that the decision whether or not to 
devalue depends on the size of the fixed credibility cost and on the relative importance of 
output and exchange rate deviations in the Government loss function (the weight 
parameter z). The larger z and C, the larger (in absolute value) the size of the cumulative 
shocks must be to trigger a regime switch. This is what (19) says. 
 
 
Expected time 2 devaluation is thus given by the probability that the cumulative shocks 
exceed the cut-off level times the conditional size of devaluation, given by (13). The 
behaviour of rational investors will depend on the conjectured response of the Government 
to the shocks and to each other’s actions as well. 
It is important to note that commitment to the peg, and the economic and political costs 
that follow reneging on it, introduce an important bias into foreign investors’ decisions 
when they optimise their portfolios. We have seen that the existence of a fixed cost affects 
the Government’s attitude with respect to the policy mix (deflation vs devaluation) she 
faces when adjustment has to be engineered. It has been shown that for sufficiently small 
shocks it is optimal for the Government to keep the exchange rate fixed. This is equivalent 
to a truncation of the density function which exchange rate movements would have 
otherwise, in the sense that zero probability is now attached to small devaluations 
(corresponding to small shocks). The result is that the variance of period 2 exchange rate 
is smaller in the presence of the fixed cost than if the exchange rate instrument could be used costlessly. Thus, a fixed exchange rate regime provides an implicit insurance, both to 
borrowers and lenders, who are eventually led to borrow/lend more than in a flexible rate 
regime. The overborrowing/overlending effects of a fixed rate regime are often quoted in 
the literature on financial crisis
23, which stresses how fixed exchange regimes may result 
in currency mismatch and render the recipient economy subject to sudden and sharp 
exchange rate corrections. 
 
 
2.2  The behaviour of investors 
 
So far the analysis has taken the behaviour of foreign investors as given. However, 
their behaviour may crucially affect the outcome, and the argument can be made that even 
if a small shock is realised, which would not otherwise trigger any devaluation, a 
devaluation may be precipitated by investors’ panic. For illustrative purposes, a simple 
expression for the demand for peso assets is derived, following Dornbusch (1983). 
In the following discussion, the concept of Nash equilibrium is adopted; in particular, 
the behaviour of pioneers and prospective investors is an equilibrium if the action of either 
is the best response to the action of the other. 
Investors are endowed with a given level of financial wealth (w). Their utility function 
depends on the expected value and the variance of end of period wealth. 
Utility is defined as: 
 




E(w) = w(1 + E(i
*)) + xw(E(i ) - E(i
*)) is the expected end of period wealth; 
 
x is the share of wealth invested in domestic (peso) assets, and i and i
* are the real 
returns on domestic (peso) and foreign assets
24;  
 
                                                           
23 See, among others, Alba et al. (1998). 
24 Real returns are defined as nominal returns minus expected currency devaluation. 




2 V(i ) + 2x(1 - x)V(i
*,i)] is the variance of end of period 
wealth, with V(i
*), V(i ) and V(i
*,i), respectively, the variance of i
*, the variance of i and 
their covariance. 
 
Maximising (21) with respect to x yields, after substituting the expressions for expected 
value and variance of end of period wealth, the following expression for the optimal share 
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where θ is the coefficient of risk aversion, i.e θ = -U1/(U2w) and U1  and U2 are the 
derivative of utility with respect to its first and second arguments. 
In (22), θ a constant. However, risk aversion is likely to be endogenous to market 
developments; in particular, it may behave procyclically, in the sense that it falls when the 
market is booming and rises when the market stagnates. The issue of destabilising market 
competition, raised by Taylor (1998) and discussed in previous sections, is helpful in 
understanding how the behaviour of fund managers may result in competitive return 
chasing and lower risk aversion during good times. 
 
For the purpose of this analysis, it can be assumed that i
* and r
* are given, so that the 
expression for the optimal x becomes: 
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If the pioneers I0 are assumed to hold a fraction π of total initial wealth, then the 
demand for peso assets in period 0 and 1 respectively are given by: 
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Analogously, period 1 demand for peso assets by late investors is given by: 
 










− =     (26) 
 
It should be remembered that the superscript denotes the period in which the plan is 
formed and the demand expressed, while the subscript denotes the “cohort” to which 
investors belong, pioneers (period 0) or late (period 1). 
 
The variance of the real return on peso assets is directly related to the variance of the 
exchange rate, as perceived by investors. This variance is in turn affected by the 
realisation of period 0 current account shock. Consider the case of a negative period 0 
shock. Even if the negative shock is “small”, in the sense that devaluation is expected to 
be suboptimal at time 2, the cut-off value for period 1 shock will be consequently smaller. 
Hence the probability that devaluation will turn out to be a desirable option increases; this 
in turn reduces desired holdings of peso assets via both a higher expected depreciation and 
a larger exchange rate variance. A fortiori, if the shock is so “large” that devaluation is 
made necessary, holding peso assets becomes undesirable, if not appropriately 
compensated by larger returns. 
In this setup, the assumption that capital is invested in liquid assets, i.e. it is short term, 
and can thus be easily and promptly repatriated, proves to be a potential source of 
instability. It can be shown that under some contingencies (relating to the size of the 
observed period 0 shock), the sustainability of the exchange rate peg may depend on the 
beliefs of investors about each other’s response to the shock. The initial shock might be 
“mild”, in the sense that it would not by itself (i.e. provided there’s no panic on investors’ 
side) push the required external adjustment so far as to force the Government to devalue
25. 
Yet, investors’ panic – in the sense that either early investors liquidate and repatriate their 
investments, or late comers fail to provide ongoing lending, or both - may eventually push 
the required external adjustment beyond the devaluation triggering critical level. Assuming the shock is mild, in the above sense, if investors could co-ordinate on the “no 
panic” attitude, then no devaluation would be triggered, thus justifying ex post their 
behaviour. On the other hand, failure to co-ordinate would result in a currency crisis, 
which again would ex post justify panic. Hence, there may be two equally rational 
equilibria, one “good” with no capital flight and ongoing lending, and one “bad” with 
capital flight and ongoing lending failure.  
This instability is inherent to the structure of the market, with particular respect to the 
short term nature of capital flows, those in particular that result from portfolio 
diversification strategies and the desire to chase the high returns offered by emerging 
markets’ assets during booming periods. Furthermore, early investors’ re-optimisation of 
their portfolio, in response to the observed shock, is easily seen to potentially worsen the 
likelihood that instability arises.  
The above discussion presumes the possibility of identifying some “mild” range for the 
initial shock in which multiple equilibria arise which depend on investors’ beliefs about 
each other’s resolve – to stay or leave (if pioneers) and to enter or keep out (if late 
comers). The identification of the relevant conditions on the size of the shock is the 
subject of next section. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
25 For example, the “mild shock might be represented in figure 1 by a shift from the initial adjustment constraint 
(i.e. the one passing through the origin) to the one indicated by X2<X
c. 2.3 Three  scenarios 
 
The above discussion can be summarised by defining three possible scenarios. Let us 
recall that, given the exchange rate at time 0 is fixed at the level which equilibrates the 
current account, ε0 is the current account surplus in period 0 and the expected surplus in 
period 1. For simplicity, let’s assume that ε0 is negative (so that the domestic economy 
runs a current deficit). 
It is also useful here to define R as the initial lever of foreign exchange reserves. 
Interpreting R as the level of actual reserves held by the Government, means ignoring the 
possibility that she could borrow reserves in case of need (for example by accessing IMF 
lending). On the other hand, R may include a contingent credit line. It will be shown later 
that allowing the Government to borrow reserves can isolate the economy from instability. 
This points in favour of an international lender of last resort. 
Another useful reminder is reporting equation (19) in rearranged terms, i.e.: 
 
z C X X
c 2 2 γ β
β
γ
+ − = −     (19’) 
 
Recall that X is the autonomous (random) component of the current account and X is 
its value before period 0 shock. X
c is the level of X2 which triggers the decision to 
devalue: for cumulative (negative) shocks exceeding (in absolute value) X
c –X, it is 
optimal for the Government to adjust by using a mix of deflation and devaluation
26. X2 –
X, is the current “surplus” which would be run in period 2 (actually a deficit, if negative) 
if no adjustment were undertaken; given that it is required that period 2 current account be 
in balance, it is also the size of the adjustment to be carried out at period 2. 
Finally, a simplifying assumption must be made about the reaction of investors to fears 
of devaluation. It is assumed that either investor’s desired peso assets holdings fall to zero 
if she expects a devaluation to occur, be it as a necessary policy consequence of period 0 
shock or the result of the other investor panic. 
 
                                                           
26 Recall that given the assumed non reverting process for Xt and the assumption that ε2 is zero, X2–X is equal to 
ε0+ε1 (see equation 3), and X
c–X is the critical size for the cumulative shocks. CASE 1)  The first step consists of identifying the values for ε0 which trigger a 
devaluation by themselves, i.e. even though there’s no external pressure from the capital 
account side. The range is defined according to the following inequality: 
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  The left hand side of (27) is the expected current imbalance which period 2 is 
expected, after the realisation of ε0, to inherit from previous periods shocks (recall that ε0 
is period 0 current “surplus” and also period 1 (and 2) expected “surplus”, given zero 
expected period 1 shock and the non reverting nature of the current account
27. This case is 
trivial: the shock is so large that the expected period 2 adjustment exceeds the critical 
level, which makes devaluation the unique, unavoidable outcome. For values of ε0 lower 
than εL, both representative investors expect an immediate capital loss from devaluation, 
irrespective of their beliefs about each other’s behaviour. It is important to note that 
availability of reserves plays no role in (27); this follows from the interpretation of period 
2 current account balance as a steady state equilibrium condition. Allowing reserves to 
mitigate the required adjustment would be equivalent to assuming that in an infinite 
horizon framework a limited amount of reserves could finance an external imbalance 
indefinitely. 
  
CASE 2)  Under this case, the range of shock values for which no crisis occurs, 
either as a consequence of a necessary policy adjustment or as the result of panic. 
Contrarily to case 1, here the level of accumulated reserves can contribute in a decisive 
way to the final outcome. In fact, even if the shock is smaller (in absolute value) than the 
above critical level, the capital account in period 2 might turn negative, and the reserves 
level might prove insufficient to finance the capital drain. That might force devaluation is 
in no contradiction with the fact that adjustment is a steady state requirement, even if any negative capital account can only be a temporary phenomenon. The domestic authorities 
have to find the foreign currency to finance both current and capital imbalances, however 
temporary, and they must adjust the domestic economic conditions to this end. Capital 
flight might then push the required adjustment so far that the Government decides to let 
the currency float. 
  Investors’ failure to co-ordinate eventually causes the unnecessary currency 
devaluation. 
 
What range of values for period 0 shock ensures that no panic can ever occur? In order 
to answer this question it is necessary to consider, in turn, the perspective of each investor 
under the “worst” assumption about the behaviour of the other (i.e. total repatriation if the 
other is the early investor, zero ongoing lending if she is the late investor). This is done in 
A and B below. 
 
A)  Let’s start with pioneers. Their decision to keep money invested in peso assets 
(after the portfolio adjustment following re-optimisation) is independent of the resolve of 
late investors if, and only if, provided inequality (27) holds, the eventual reserves shortage 
is not sufficient to force adjustment beyond the critical level, defined by equation (19’). 
This is the case if: 
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In the left-hand side of (28), the first term is the (expected) adjustment required for 
bringing balance in the current account. The expression in square brackets is nothing but 
the (expected) shortage of reserves
28, obtained by summing up initial reserves (R), the 
(expected) cumulative period 0 and 1 current “surplus” (2ε0), period 0 capital inflows and 
period 1 capital outflows
29.  
Inequality (28) can be conveniently simplified as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
27 See previous note. 
28 Note that in the discussion shortage of reserves is actually being assumed (which implies a negative square 
brackets term). If there was no shortage, then – given that this case assumes ε0 >(X
c–X) – no crisis could, a fortiori, 
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(28’) defines the range of period 0 shocks which, from the perspective of early 
investors, ensures no crisis. 
0
H ε  denotes the lower bound for the above (infinite) interval, 
and superscript “0” indicates that it refers to category of investors’ perspective. 
 
B)  Turning to late investors’ perspective, the reasoning is analogous to the one 
done under A. Late investors expect to be safe, even assuming total early 
capital repatriation, if: 
 
[] () z C X X K R
c 2 2 1
1 0 0 2 2 γ β
β
γ
ε ε + − = − > + + +    (29) 
 













+ − − −
>     (29’) 
 




Both values for 
0
H ε  and 
1
H ε  are clearly negative. However, it cannot be said a priori 
whether either or both are larger or smaller than  L ε . As pointed in footnote 3, the analysis 
becomes interesting only if the authorities actually face a shortage of reserves, which is 
equivalent to requiring that 
0
H ε  and 
1
H ε  are larger (i.e. closer to zero) than  L ε . This is the 
case if the following inequalities are satisfied: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
29 Recall that this is the perspective of pioneers, who are assuming the “worst scenario” in which late investors do 
not provide any ongoing lending. L H
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After rearranging, (30) and (31) are respectively equivalent to: 
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Once it is assumed that (30’) and (31’) hold, so that existence of a “mild” range in 
ensured, it only remains to establish which of 
0
H ε  and 
1
H ε  is larger. The smaller one, in 
fact, is the relevant lower bound for the range of period 0 shock’s values, and 
consequently the upper bound for the mid range, i.e. the instability region. That this is 
true, follows from the (implicitly made) assumption that the two types of investors have 
common knowledge about each other’s desired peso assets holdings, the state of the 




H ε , then early investors know that even if ε0<
0




H ε , late 
investors will provide ongoing lending and that this will suffice to keep the required 
adjustment to a sustainable level (in the sense that it does not exceed the critical level). An 
analogous reasoning applies if the opposite holds true, i.e. if 
0
H ε  <
1
H ε . 
It is the case that 
0
H ε  >
1
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Having assumed identical utility functions for pioneers and late investors, (32) and 
(32’) imply that the category of investors whose perspectives “dominate” (in the sense of 
determining the lower bound for the “safety” no-crisis range) is the one holding the largest 
share of total wealth, and which then has the largest demand for peso assets. 
 
CASE 3)  With conditions (30’) and (31’) in mind, it is possible to define the 
instability range as the one delimited by  L ε  and the minimum between 
0
H ε  and 
1































ε ε  (33) 
 
where   
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(33) defines the range of values for ε0 over which 2 rational equilibria coexist. There’s 
a good equilibrium in which early investors carry out their marginal portfolio re-
optimisation,  but do not massively repatriate their capital, and at the same time late 
investors carry out their optimal plans, providing ongoing lending. But there’s a second, 
worse equilibrium, in which pioneers completely repatriate their period 0 investments, and 
late investors fail to provide ongoing lending. The occurrence of a currency crisis 
eventually depends on whether the two representative investors manage to co-ordinate on 
the good equilibrium. This is the main point of this paper: a currency crisis may turn out to 
be self-fulfilling. However, contrarily to the typical self-fulfilling model, what ultimately 
determines multiplicity of equilibria in this set-up is not investors’ concern about the behaviour of the policy-maker, but their concern about the behaviour of each other. Here, 
eventually, the Government simply faces the external transfer consequences of investors’ 
co-ordination failure. 
It is worth stressing, once more, that the existence of such a “mild” shock range 
depends on whether (30’) and (31’) hold. The reason for this is straightforward. If either 
(30’) or (31’) does not hold, it means that the corresponding representative investor has 
such a large desired level of peso assets, that she can carry out her optimal investment 
plans independently of the other investor, whatever the shock – conditional on the it not 
being in the devaluation range. 
Without necessarily aiming at any faithful representation of the reality, the question 
arises whether an instability range is likely to exist. This leads to the comparison between 
the relative sizes of steady state peso asset holdings (i.e. period 1 desired levels), plus 
initial reserves, and the critical current account adjustment. It sounds unlikely that the 
latter may dominate the former. This does not however make the present analysis 
worthless, and I give two reasons for this. 
•  First, the present model assumes that the domestic economy enters period 0 with no 
short term debt. Allowing for investors to start with positive holdings of short term 
peso assets would make the conditions for the existence of an instability range more 
likely, and more so the larger they are. This is because from either investor’s 
perspective, the worst case - in which the other panics – is much worse if the latter 
can withdraw a large amount of outstanding debt. 
•  Furthermore, if the model were extended to include many (possibly infinite) 
investors, the size of each investor’s demand for peso assets would virtually go to 
zero, thus giving them no command on the final outcome. 
 
With the above points in mind, the next section is devoted to some simple comparative 
statics, in order to understand what factors contribute to making instability more or less 
likely to break the domestic scene. 
 
 
2.4  Comparative statics and policy implications 
 A preliminary important point to note is that the above conditions, with respect to ε0, 
are not in reduced form. In fact both 
1
0 K  and 
1
1 K  depend on ε0, through its impact on the 
probability of a regime switch. Deriving a reduced form solution would require more 
structure in investors’ choices, in particular with respect to the probability of a regime 
switch, which is outside the scope of this paper. This does not preclude deriving some 
unambiguous conclusions concerning the impact of the model’s parameters on the 
likelihood that a shock pushes the economy into instability. That this is so follows from 
both 
1
0 K  and 
1
1 K  being inversely related to the probability of a regime switch, which 
makes them positive functions of ε0.  
The latter point is better explained in relation to the analysis of the impact that a larger 
fixed credibility cost (C
2) has on the identified ranges. Inspecting the expressions for  L ε , 
0
H ε  and 
1
H ε  reveals the following points: 
1)  L ε  is negatively related to C, so that a larger fixed cost implies a larger (in absolute 
value) negative shock is necessary to force a devaluation irrespective of the behaviour of 
investors. Hence the upper bound for the necessary devaluation region moves further from 
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H ε  and 
1
H ε  are also negative functions of C, so that likelihood that a negative shock 
breaks the critical size required for multiple equilibria is also decreased by a larger C. If 
the Government who is more concerned about her own credibility, then a larger shock (in 
absolute value) must hit  the economy to force her to devalue, so that the necessary 
devaluation becomes more unlikely. This reflects on the larger absolute size for the shock 
required to cause investors’ worries about each other. These conclusions are true 
irrespective of the functional dependence of 
1
0 K  and 
1
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where the inequality follows, again, from the parameters’ sign plus the fact that 
1
0 K  is 
increasing in ε0. Similarly, the derivative of 
1



































    (36) 
 
In a similar way, it could be shown that  L ε , 
0
H ε  and 
1
H ε  are all negatively related to z, 
the weight attached to real exchange rate deviations from target in the policy loss function. 
The interpretation is straightforward: the larger the Government’s concern about exchange 
rate deviations, the less inclined she is to use it as an adjustment instrument. 
The size of the instability range is easily seen to be larger, the larger C or z. In fact,  L ε  
is shifted more to the left than either 
0
H ε  or 
1


















Hence, while the likelihood that “something may go wrong” is unambiguously smaller, if 
either C or z are larger, whether the probability that instability arise is actually made larger 
or smaller depends on the shape of the density function of the random shock. 
Different considerations matter in defining, qualitatively, the credibility of the 
commitment to a predetermined exchange rate regime. Because, especially in Latin 
American Countries, such regimes have been set up in order to provide the system with a 
nominal anchor and reduce inflation, larger costs of disinflation make the commitment 
more credible. Also, the degree of “technical” irreversibility is very important; as noted by 
Mishkin and Savastano (2000), two types of highly irreversible (“hard”) pegs are those implied by a currency board and by full dollarisation
30. In the former, where the domestic 
currency is backed 100% by a foreign (“anchor”) currency; the commitment has a legal 
backing; in the latter, the domestic currency is eliminated and substituted with the foreign 
one. Although abandoning either of the above systems entails large costs, yet they do not 
completely isolate a Country from speculative attacks (as shown by the Argentine 
experience in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis); they may emerge as a result of a large 
negative shock raising doubts about its sustainability, or fears of confiscation or limits to 
repatriation of capital. Furthermore, hard pegs imply a complete loss of control on 
monetary policy, which leaves no scope to alleviate the output effects of large adverse 
demand shocks. It is not easy to say how much of the success in eliminating pressure on 
the argentine peso in 1995; the strong commitment of a currency board could well have 
played a role, alongside with a healthy banking system and proper policy measures, helped 
by the substantial injection of multilateral institutions funds. 
The impact of a larger initial level of reserves on 
0
H ε  and 
1
H ε  is also negative, but 
reserves are irrelevant to  L ε . This reflects the previously discussed fact that reserves 
cannot be used to postpone adjustment, while lack of sufficient reserves to cover a 
negative capital account may eventually force a non necessary devaluation. This is an 
important point, because if the possibility for the Government to access an external source 
of reserves is introduced, then the level of initial reserves can be made arbitrarily large; by 
pushing 
0
H ε  and 
1
H ε  to the left of  L ε , this can rule out instability. Intuitively, in order for 
such a credit line to be effective in this respect, investors must believe that it is made 
promptly and unconditionally available to the economy eventually suffering the pressure 
of instability. This leads to the desirability of a lender of last resort for Countries 
experiencing a temporary self-fulfilling liquidity drain. 
The remaining predetermined variable in the model is 
0
0 K , i.e. the level of period 0 
desired peso assets – and, having excluded zero initial peso assets holdings, the level of 
period 0 capital inflows. As it does not appear in the expressions for  L ε ,
0
H ε  and 
1
H ε , it can 
be concluded that it is irrelevant to the likelihood of either the unique bad equilibrium or 
instability. As previously noted, allowing a positive level of initial short term debt would 
make instability more likely, more so the larger such level. But even in the latter case, 
0
0 K  
                                                           
30 Argentina has a currency board system since 1991; Panama is an example (the only one in Latin America) of a 
fully dollarized economy. would be irrelevant. One way in which 
0
0 K  could matter is through its eventual impact – 
not modelled here – on the size of the shock itself. It is often argued that large capital 
inflows may drive the domestic adsorption on an expansionary path, by inflating domestic 
assets, releasing more credit to the private sector, and by appreciating the real exchange 
rate. Intuitively, these feed-back (negative) effects on fundamentals make large initial 
capital inflows less desirable, although lower initial capital flows are likely to be 
associated – ceteris paribus - with lower period 1 desired peso assets, as they both share 
the same determinants (e.g. the level of total wealth and the degree of risk aversion). 
 
The analysis in this paper highlights the role of short-term borrowing and the 
speculative nature of capital flows. Investments, both first and second period ones, were 
assumed to be in liquid assets, although means of a long-term portfolio diversification 
strategy. It is precisely this feature, plus the desire to adjust their portfolio to adverse, 
though mild, economic developments, that creates the potential for instability. If 
0
0 K  was 
reformulated to be a two period illiquid investment, the perverse results previously 
obtained would fail to hold, as no repatriation of early investments would be allowed. 
Table 1 below reports facts about some key macroeconomic conditions in Mexico, Korea, 
Indonesia and Thailand, i.e. the crisis Countries; for the sake of comparison, Argentina, 
Chile and Malaysia are also included as cases of heavy external borrowers, in the same 
Regions, which escaped collapse.  
 
Tab.1  Macroeconomic indicators in the years prior to financial crises 
    Mex  Arg  Chile  Thai  Kor  Ind  Mal 
1*  Sh-t debt (ml $)
a  36257 8653 4130 37613 65680  32230 11068
2           % of GNP  9.2679 3.3982 9.4491 21.2993 13.6725  14.5655 11.7044
3**  Portfolio (ml $)
 b  55714 28928 1721 16329 52090  14594 -4269
4               % GNP  4.2667 4.2083 1.1881 1.8234 2.0907  1.3246 -0.953
5*  CA (%GNP)
 a  -7.582 -3.973 -3.626 -8.32 -4.789  -3.463 -4.86
6*  Res (%GNP)
 a  6.4669 6.0871 23.7233 21.8837 7.1106  8.7655 29.4957
7*  Res (%GNP) 89
 c  1.7088 1.3105 10.6662 6.0823 3.3719  2.9592 9.2129
Sources: *World Bank, Global Development Finance (1999) , **IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (1997 and 1999) 
a1993 for Mex, Arg, Chile; 1996 for Thai, Kor, Ind, Mal     
bCumulative: 90-93 for Mex, Arg, Chile; 90-96 for Thai, Kor, Ind, Mal 
c1989 Res in % of: GNP-1993 for Mex, Arg, Chile; GNP-1996 for Thai, Kor, Ind, Mal. 
 The first row shows the level of short term debt in the year prior to the one in which the 
first signs of a crisis were perceived (1994 for the Latin American and 1996 for the Asian 
Countries); the second row expresses it as a percentage of GNP in that year. It appears that 
all crisis Countries had a substantial amount of short term obligations, ranging from 9% in 
Mexico to 21% in Thailand; an exception is Argentina , with a figure as low as 3%. Short 
term debt, however, do not entirely capture the whole amount of short term-speculative 
capital flows, as they exclude portfolio flows which in some cases have also been quite 
large; cumulative portfolio flows, between 1990 and the pre-crisis year, are reported in the 
third row (the fourth shows their yearly average value in percent of GNP). Mexico 
received portfolio flows for an average 4% of GNP, a figure similar to that for Argentina; 
Korea and Thailand also were large portfolio capital importers, with around 2% of GNP. 
Indonesia and Chile have has a lower percentage (1.3 and 1.2 respectively), while 
Malaysia experienced an average net outflow. Hence, in Chile and Malaysia relatively low 
portfolio flows somehow compensate for the substantial accumulation of debt; the 
opposite is true of Argentina. A more complete picture can be gained by looking at the 
size of the current account imbalance and at the level of reserves in the year prior to the 
crisis: those values are shown, respectively, in rows 5 and 6, as percent of pre-crisis GNP. 
All Countries had a current deficit; the 8% of Mexico and Thailand are striking, but no 
one had a deficit of less than about 3.5%. With respect to reserves, the figures are 
impressive for Thailand, Chile and Malaysia (with more than 20% of GNP in the year 
prior to crisis); however, as row 7 shows, it is only in Chile and Malaysia that the level of 
reserves (shown in percent of pre-crisis GNP) was high in 1989, i.e. just before the large 
wave of private flows of the 90s.  
Although no single indicator neatly discriminates among crisis and non-crisis 
Countries, taken together the facts illustrated seem to indicate that the ones where a crisis 
actually  emerged are those more vulnerable in terms of a combination of external 
imbalance (current account), accumulated short term liabilities and foreign reserves. 
Argentina stands somehow in the middle, with a picture similar to Mexico – but half its 
current account deficit; in fact, it was the first and most heavily hit by contagion in 1995. 
As previously noted, the credibility of its currency regime, a sound banking system and 
the prompt foreign assistance are among the facts which may explain the success of its 
defense. 
 Given the importance of the accumulation of short term liabilities in the system, a 
trivial policy implication relates to the scope for stricter regulation or the provision of disincentives aimed at discouraging short-term flows. As argued by Cordella (1998), this 
may reduce perceived instability and uncertainty over future outcomes, which in turn may 
stimulate more long-term investments. Chilean extensive controls on short term capital 
inflows are often quoted as a successful policy towards reducing the risk of a financial 
crisis. It should be noted, however, that the evidence on the effectiveness of capital control 
measures in reducing the volume of short term capital flows is only mixed; those measures 
appear to be successful on impact, but less so in the medium to long run
31. 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the literature has raised the following objection to 
models that exhibit multiple equilibria and the possibility of self-fulfilling crises: they do 
not specify what co-ordinates agents’ expectations and determines the final outcome, 
among the many possible. As noted, with a few exceptions the existing literature does no 
more than resorting to sunspots or focal points as co-ordinating devices. While these 
explanations are often blamed as ad hoc and economically meaningless
32, some stylised 
evidence appears to support them. In many of the recent crises, some major events appear 
to have had disruptive consequences on market sentiment, be it an external economic 
development, an important political event or the failure of a large institution
33. 
The present model suffers the same shortcoming as other self-fulfilling models. If the 
initial shock falls in the “mild” range, than nothing says what determines which outcome 
eventually prevails. In my opinion, however, it is much more sensible to think of a co-
ordination failure among different investors, equally concerned about the value of their 
respective investments, rather than of a representative agent suddenly expecting the 
domestic authorities to abandon an exchange rate regime. Furthermore, in this model a 
fundamental shock is assumed to break the scene and to raise investors’ concern. 
Intuitively, it may also be possible to look for a co-ordinating device in the developments 
of the domestic assets market - once the model is translated in an ideal infinite horizon-
continuous time version and some noise is introduced which makes inference about each 
other’s behaviour from asset prices evolution subject to uncertainty. 
 
 
                                                           
31 See Edwards (1996 and 1998). Edwards (1998) also investigates the effect of the imposition of capital controls 
on the dynamic responses of domestic interest rates to foreign interest rates shocks and of the real exchange rate to 
capital inflows, and finds little evidence of any significant effects. 
32 See, among others, Davies and Vines (1995).  
4.  Conclusions 
 
This paper develops a three period model to show how a “non necessary” currency 
crisis may be determined by an investors’ driven form of instability. Capital flows are 
assumed to result from international portfolio adjustment. The latter is not instantaneous, 
and is carried out by two heterogeneous categories of investors (early and late), who enter 
the domestic market at two different stages (time 0 and 1). The Government, who 
minimises a welfare loss function depending positively on output deflation and exchange 
rate devaluation, is assumed to face an adjustment problem involving the use of a linear 
combination of deflation and devaluation. In addition, she is assumed to bear a fixed 
credibility cost in case a devaluation is engineered. 
The analysis has shown how the inability of existing and prospective investors to co-
ordinate their actions may generate a currency crisis as the result of a switch between two 
equally rational equilibria: a “good” one in which pioneers do not repatriate their capital 
and ongoing lending takes place (and no devaluation is triggered), and a “bad” one in 
which capital flight and failure to provide ongoing lending to force devaluation. The 
behaviour of the two representative investors crucially depends on the conjectures they 
hold about each other’s strategy (stay/exit for the pioneer, enter/not enter for the late 
investor). Devaluation is triggered - if expectations of the bad equilibrium prevail - 
because too big a capital account external transfer adds to the initial “innocuous” shock for 
the Government to fulfil her commitment to the fixed exchange rate.  
The possibility of multiple equilibria, however, arises only for realisations of period 
zero shock included in a “mild” range of values. The severity of the negative shock needed 
to expose the economy to the risk of instability is found to be a positive function of: the 
initial level of foreign exchange reserves, the bias of Government preferences against 
devaluation (relative to output deflation) and of the value of her commitment to the fixed 
exchange rate regime.  
Although the current account has been assumed initially balanced, it is clear that the 
chances of a fixed exchange rate regime to survive are larger if the Country has strong 
fundamentals to start with (here this means a net current position as close to balance as 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
33 For example, confidence in Mexico was hardly hit by the US niterest rate rises and by political turmoil following 
the Colisio murdering early in 1994.  possible). This creates room for fundamental negative shocks to hit without forcing a 
devaluation or generating the risk of instability.  
In setting the above dynamics, a crucial role is played by the short-term nature of 
capital flows. If investment was reformulated to be in long-term assets, than the possibility 
of multiple equilibria would disappear. Also, the same result could be obtained by 
allowing the domestic authorities to access a sufficiently large line of contingent credit, to 
be added to accumulated reserves in eventually financing the panic-led capital outflow. 
This would suffice to free investors of any concern for each other behaviour in case of a 
“mild” shock. These observations clearly point in favour of measures aimed at altering the 
term structure of foreign capital inflows, with an obvious preference for less liquid ones. 
Also, they imply the desirability of an international lender of last resort, who is ready to 
finance short-run panic-driven capital account imbalances. REFERENCES 
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